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Simulating Moral Actions: An 
Investigation of Personal Force in 
Virtual Moral Dilemmas
K. B. Francis1, S. Terbeck2, R. A. Briazu2, A. Haines3, M. Gummerum2, G. Ganis  2 &  
I. S. Howard  4
Advances in Virtual Reality (VR) technologies allow the investigation of simulated moral actions in 
visually immersive environments. Using a robotic manipulandum and an interactive sculpture, we 
now also incorporate realistic haptic feedback into virtual moral simulations. In two experiments, we 
found that participants responded with greater utilitarian actions in virtual and haptic environments 
when compared to traditional questionnaire assessments of moral judgments. In experiment 
one, when incorporating a robotic manipulandum, we found that the physical power of simulated 
utilitarian responses (calculated as the product of force and speed) was predicted by individual levels of 
psychopathy. In experiment two, which integrated an interactive and life-like sculpture of a human into 
a VR simulation, greater utilitarian actions continued to be observed. Together, these results support a 
disparity between simulated moral action and moral judgment. Overall this research combines state-
of-the-art virtual reality, robotic movement simulations, and realistic human sculptures, to enhance 
moral paradigms that are often contextually impoverished. As such, this combination provides a better 
assessment of simulated moral action, and illustrates the embodied nature of morally-relevant actions.
There is more reason in your body than in your best wisdom1. Moral dilemmas contrast the choice between indi-
vidual rights and pursuing ‘the greater good’. Researchers from a variety of disciplines have long explored this 
issue in “thought experiments” that aim to understand and interpret moral decision-making. Perhaps the most 
acknowledged (or well-known) example of this is the “Trolley Problem”; incorporating two contrasting dilem-
mas, which have been vastly deliberated in the fields of philosophy, neuroscience, and psychology2,3. In the switch 
dilemma, individuals must decide whether to flick a switch to redirect a trolley car to kill one worker on the 
tracks rather than letting it proceed and kill five workers. Alternatively, in the footbridge dilemma, individuals 
must decide whether to push a man in front of the trolley, in order to stop it moving and thereby prevent it from 
killing the five workers. These two dilemmas are the subject of much debate, as individuals tend to endorse the 
utilitarian response (killing one to save many) in the “impersonal” switch case but refuse to do so in the “personal” 
footbridge case4.
Several theories have attempted to understand these divergent responses, given their structural similarity in 
entailing the five-for-one trade off4. One way to examine these distinct responses is to consider the moral prin-
ciples that influence moral judgments5. For example, Greene, et al.6 found that if personal force–“the force that 
directly impacts the other [person] is generated by the agent’s muscles”6–was required in a dilemma, utilitarian 
judgments were significantly lower. This concept of personal force reaffirms the “simulated motor plan” hypoth-
esis, suggesting that when faced with a personal dilemma, individuals imagine carrying out the harmful action7. 
In the footbridge dilemma for example, we might imagine ourselves pushing the person, shaping our hands and 
preparing our bodies in such a way as to direct our personal force onto them. In doing so, we are faced with an 
immediate emotional aversion to this act2 and so we judge it as unacceptable7. This theory relates back to the find-
ing that responding in a utilitarian manner to personal dilemmas requires suppression of an affective response2. 
In a similar line of research, Cushman8 related personal force and physical contact back to reinforcement learning 
mechanisms. For humans, simply the act of pushing carries with it a history of learned moral violations. The 
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switch dilemma on the other hand, does not contain personal force, involving the atypical moral action of flicking 
a switch. As such, it does not trigger the same aversion2,8.
In one experiment, Cushman, et al.9 utilised an active behavioural paradigm in order to investigate simulated 
harmful actions. In their study, the authors had participants simulate harmful actions such as hitting a plastic 
baby doll or hitting a PVC leg with a hammer, and found that individuals experience a strong aversion to per-
forming these actions. They demonstrated that the degree to which individuals found simulating canonically 
harmful actions aversive, predicted the likelihood of endorsing a utilitarian moral judgment; the greater the 
degree of aversion in the behavioural paradigm, the less likely a subsequent utilitarian judgment9. However, one 
criticism of this behavioural paradigm is that harmful actions did not result in specific outcomes such as saving 
more lives9. As such, this paradigm may not offer a valid comparison to the classic one-for-many dilemmas fre-
quently adopted in the moral domain2.
Recently Virtual Reality (VR) methods have been employed to study moral decision-making in which “the 
full repertoire of contextual features comes into play”10 allowing questioning of the theoretical and normative 
decisions in the framework of moral action11–16. In simulations of the switch dilemma, Patil, et al.10 found that 
utilitarian responses were greater in VR when action was required compared to text-based counterparts when 
judgments were required. This supports previous findings regarding the disparity between judgment and simu-
lated action17. Furthermore, and in line with this, we recently incorporated the personal footbridge dilemma in a 
virtual paradigm18. Participants were either asked to simulate an action in this virtual dilemma (group one) or to 
respond to judgment questions in the theoretical version of the dilemma (group two). Overall, it was found that 
there were a greater proportion of utilitarian responses when action was required, as compared to the theoretical 
counterpart when judgments were required18. Anti-social personality traits, including psychopathy, predicted 
this endorsement of harm in VR, but did not predict utilitarian judgments in text-based counterparts, providing 
further evidence for the role of trait psychopathy in judgment-action discrepancy19–21. Despite this, research has 
yet to consider the impact of incorporating tools that allow the examination of physical contact and personal 
force in the context of simulated moral action. Whilst the virtual footbridge dilemma is “up close and personal”2, 
sensorimotor qualities and aspects of embodiment are still absent15. In order to address this limitation, in the fol-
lowing experiments, we incorporate haptic feedback within VR paradigms, examining its influence on simulated 
moral action.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 examined the relationship between moral judgment and simulated moral action, and more specif-
ically, the influence of haptic feedback on simulated moral actions. Here, we use a robotic haptic interface (vBOT 
system) to simulate performing a realistic physical action in response to moral dilemmas involving personal 
force22. The vBOT system can simulate the physical resistance force that would be experienced from touching or 
pushing a physical object and is thus able to generate realistic haptic feedback. For example, it can generate the 
sensation of moving the hand through water or touching a spherical object. In the present experiment, we use 
the term ‘Haptic Virtual Reality’ or haptic VR to refer to any technology that can generate realistic sensations. 
As such, the vBOT is categorised here as a VR system since it can simulate making contact with virtual objects. 
Given that utilitarian endorsements have been found to be greater in moral action paradigms when compared to 
judgment counterparts17 and that virtual moral dilemmas often elicit a greater proportion of simulated utilitarian 
actions10,14,18, we predicted that utilising this virtual action framework would lead to an increase in simulated 
utilitarian responses. Previous research has argued that this response pattern arises from increased contextual 
saliency and a heightened focus on the negative consequences of inaction in VR10,18,23. Trait psychopathy may 
predict this increase, given findings that antisocial traits result in a greater proportion of utilitarian responses in 
action frameworks19–21.
Methods
Participants. Forty participants (34 females, 6 males) between 18 and 31 years (M = 20.23, SD = 2.97 years) 
were recruited from the Plymouth University (School of Psychology) participant pool and participated for course 
credit. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were right-handed. This research received 
ethical approval from Plymouth University Ethics Committee and informed consent was obtained from all par-
ticipants. All experiments were performed in accordance with the guidelines and regulations set out by the ethics 
committee.
Measures. Participants were asked to fill out an electronic questionnaire comprising four self-report 
questionnaires:
The Levenson Psychopathy Scale (LSRP)24 is a self-report measure of trait Psychopathy designed for 
non-institutionalised populations. It comprises a two-factor structure measuring both primary (i.e., callousness) 
(16 items; α = 0.90) and secondary psychopathic traits (i.e., impulsivity) (10 items; α = 0.66). The scale contains 
26 items in total that are rated on a 4-point Likert scale (from 1 = strongly disagree to 4 = strongly agree). The scale 
includes items such as “Success is based on survival of the fittest; I am not concerned about losers”.
The Hexaco-IP-PR 25 is a personality inventory assessing six dimensions of personality. The inventory meas-
ures the following characteristics: Honesty-Humility (Items 10; α = 0.81), Emotionality (Items 10; α = 0.83), 
Extraversion (Items 10; α = 0.74), Agreeableness (Items 10; α = 0.87), Conscientiousness (Items 10; α = 0.80) 
and Openness to experience (Items 10; α = 0.78). The inventory contains 60 items, rated on a 5-point Likert scale 
(from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). The inventory contains items such as “I want people to know that 
I am an important person of high status”.
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Moral Judgment and Simulated Action Measures. The between-groups experiment comprised two 
conditions to which participants were randomly allocated; a judgment condition (N = 20) and a simulated action 
condition (N = 20). In both conditions, participants were presented with vignettes describing the footbridge 
dilemma and 14 further personal force dilemmas. These moral dilemmas were selected from those originally used 
in Greene, et al.2 and also included five personal force dilemmas adapted from this database (see Supplementary 
Material: Appendix A online). Of the dilemmas originally used in Greene, et al.2, personal dilemmas were modi-
fied to ensure that each involved personal force. For example, consider the “euthanasia” dilemma:
You are a leader of a small group of soldiers. You are on your way back from a completed mission deep in enemy 
territory when one of your men has stepped in a trap that has been set by the enemy and is badly injured. The trap 
is connected to a radio device that by now has alerted the enemy to your presence. They will soon be on their way.
If the enemy finds your injured man they will torture him and kill him. He begs you not to leave him behind, but if 
you try to take him with you your entire group will be captured. The only way to prevent this injured soldier from 
being tortured is to shoot him yourself.
This dilemma, while categorised as personal, does not involve personal force according to its original defini-
tion6. As such, in the present experiment it was adapted as follows:
If the enemy finds your injured man they will torture him and kill him. He begs you not to leave him behind, but if 
you try to take him with you your entire group will be captured. The only way to prevent this injured soldier from 
being tortured is to kill him yourself by stabbing him.
Replacing a gun with a knife ensures that “the force that directly impacts the other [person] is generated by 
the agent’s muscles”6.
In both conditions, utilitarian and non-utilitarian responses were represented as a binary variable and the 
mean utilitarian proportion across all dilemmas was subsequently calculated for each individual by dividing the 
number of their utilitarian responses by the total number of dilemmas.
Simulated Action Variables. In the simulated action condition, as well as generating an overall response 
to the dilemma, the vBOT system provided additional measures including force, speed and subsequent power.
Force. Baseline force measurements were calculated for each participant in order to control for varying strengths 
among participants. The vBOT arm allowed participants to push forward when simulating a utilitarian action or 
to pull away when refusing to endorse an action (non-utilitarian). A normalised force measure was subsequently 
calculated for the simulated utilitarian actions. Baselines measurements were first created by averaging the force 
of endorsements of actions in non-moral dilemmas (baseline force for endorsements). The normalized force 
applied by each participant when producing a simulated utilitarian response was then calculated as a proportion 
of their baseline force.
Speed. Speed was defined as the maximum speed (cm/s) that a participant moved the vBOT arm across the 
movement trajectory. Using the same procedure for force measurements, a normalised maximum speed was 
conditionally calculated for the simulated utilitarian actions. Baselines measurements were created by averaging 
the speed of endorsements of actions in non-moral dilemmas. The normalized speed was then calculated for the 
simulated utilitarian actions as a proportion of this baseline speed.
Power. The relative force and speed with which individuals simulated utilitarian actions were strongly corre-
lated, (r(18) = 0.51, p = 0.021). Given that the product of speed and force equates to a measure of power, we used 
normalised force and speed scores to create a relative measure of power for each participant. This represented the 
power exerted by an individual when simulating a utilitarian action with the vBOT arm.
Procedure. In both conditions, participants first completed the electronic questionnaire comprising the trait 
assessments. All personal force dilemmas were presented in a randomised order. In the judgment condition, 
dilemmas were presented to participants on a computer running E-Prime software and each dilemma was pre-
sented in three blocks of text that could be read at a speed determined by the participant. After each dilemma, 
participants were asked a morality question (“Is it morally acceptable to [specific to the scenario]?”) followed by 
a behavioural question (“Would you do it?”). Responses were given by selecting “Yes” (Y-key) or “No” (N-key). 
Participants were given 8 seconds to respond. This time frame was selected as it is long enough to allow responses 
that are not time-pressured but short enough to prevent a long elaborate decision-making process that would be 
unrealistic in an action framework. Similar time frame windows have been adopted in previous VR moral action 
paradigms10,16.
In the simulated action condition, participants initially completed an electronic pre-questionnaire assess-
ing their gaming experience (hours per week of video game play and the number of games played annually). 
Participants were then presented with three non-moral dilemmas (see Supplementary Material: Appendix B 
online) selected from an existing database2 to provide a baseline measure of force. The personal-force moral 
dilemmas were then presented. All dilemmas were presented using the vBOT system (see Fig. 1).
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At the start of each trial the vBOT handle first pulled the participant’s right hand to the starting position, 
which was at a central location (in the mid-sagittal plane 30 cm below the eyes and 30 cm in front of the chest). 
Participants were prevented from viewing their hand directly, and the VR system was used to overlay images of 
the hand cursor (0.5 cm radius red disk).
Participants were able to read the dilemmas in the semi-silvered mirror and as in the judgment condition, 
these were presented in blocks of text that could be read at a speed determined by the participant. Participants 
used a button press with their left hand to scroll forward through these blocks of text. After the end of each 
dilemma had been reached, upon a final left-hand button click the participant was asked (“Are you going to [spe-
cific to scenario]?”) followed by the phrase (“If so, move the arm forward to [specific to scenario]. If not, then pull 
away [specific to scenario]”). A final button press was then used to cue the response action and this generated the 
message (“Act now”). Matched to the judgment condition, after reading each dilemma in full, participants were 
given 8 seconds to respond.
A utilitarian endorsement was achieved when the handle was pushed forward into a soft object (which 
required the application of force) by more than 2 cm. The simulated soft object was located immediately forward 
of the start position and implemented using the combined effect of a weak spring (k = −4Ncm−1) and a resistive 
viscous field (k = −0.5Ncm−2). As such, when simulating a utilitarian response, the vBOT arm produced the 
physical resistance force that would be experienced when making contact with an object, thereby generating 
haptic feedback to the participant. A refused (non-utilitarian) response was achieved when the handle was pulled 
backwards more than 1.25 cm from the start position. No resistance was experience when pulling back. In this 
system, the handle position of the manipulandum is measured using optical encoders sampled at 1000 Hz and 
it uses motors operating under torque control to allow the application of end-point forces. A force transducer 
(Nano 25; ATI) is mounted under the handle to measure the applied forces.
In both conditions, if a response was omitted (no response was given after 8 seconds), the program would 
then move on to the next dilemma and the omitted scenario would be presented again at a later stage during the 
experiment. In the judgment condition, the proportion of utilitarian endorsements for morality and behavioural 
questions was recorded. In the simulated action condition, the proportion of utilitarian actions, force, and speed 
were all recorded for further analyses. Response times in the judgment and simulated action conditions were 
recorded by different systems and as such, could not be directly compared.
Data availability. The datasets generated during and/or analysed during the current investigation are avail-
able from the corresponding author on reasonable request.
Results
Pre-questionnaire Responses. In the simulated action condition, it was found that generating a utilitarian 
moral action using the vBOT system was not associated with previous gaming experience, as shown using bivar-
iate Spearman correlations comparing utilitarian actions and hours per week of video game play, (rs(18) = 0.25, 
p = 0.289) and number of games played annually, (rs(18) = 0.38, p = 0.096).
Moral Responses. Analyses compared responses to personal-force moral dilemmas in the simulated action 
condition (simulated utilitarian actions using the vBOT system) versus the judgment condition. In the simulated 
Figure 1. The vBOT System. The diagram shows the side-view of the set-up with a participant holding the 
handle of the vBOT arm with their right hand whilst viewing the monitor via a semi-silvered mirror. Text-based 
vignettes of dilemmas are displayed on the monitor for participants to read.
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action condition, participants endorsed a greater proportion of utilitarian actions in personal force dilemmas 
(M = 0.54, SD = 0.17) compared to the judgment condition when responding to both the morality question 
(M = 0.33, SD = 0.26) and the behavioural question (M = 0.41, SD = 0.24) (see Fig. 2).
Morality question: Is it morally acceptable? We conducted a one-way ANOVA with condition (simulated action; 
judgment) as the between-subjects factor. In this ANOVA, the morality question was utilised as the dependent 
variable for the judgment condition.
The assumption of homogeneity of variance was violated and as such, the Brown-Forsythe F-ratio is reported. 
Analysis revealed a main effect of condition, (F(1, 32.64) = 8.89, p = 0.005, ηp² = 0.20) with a greater proportion 
of utilitarian endorsements observed in the simulated action condition compared to the judgment condition.
Behavioural question: Would you do it? We conducted a one-way ANOVA with condition (simulated action; 
judgment) as the between-subjects factor. In this ANOVA, the behavioural question was utilised as the dependent 
variable for the judgment condition.
Analysis revealed a marginally significant main effect of condition, (F(1, 38) = 3.92, p = 0.055, ηp² = 0.10) 
with a greater proportion of utilitarian responses observed in the simulated action condition compared to the 
judgment condition.
In the judgment condition specifically, no significant difference was found when comparing responses to 
the morality question (i.e., moral acceptability) and the behavioural question (i.e., whether they would do it), 
(p = 0.378).
Personality Trait Analyses. In order to assess any differences between the personality traits of participants 
in both the judgment and simulated action conditions, a one-way ANOVA was used to compare trait measures. 
No significant differences between the judgment and simulated action conditions were found (all ps > 0.071), 
except for Honesty-Humility, (F(1, 38) = 6.31, p = 0.016, ηp² = 0.14) which was higher in the judgment condition 
(M = 3.63, SD = 0.47) than the simulated action condition (M = 3.17, SD = 0.67).
Traits and action variables. Bivariate correlations revealed that traits did not relate to utilitarian responses in 
either the judgment or the simulated action conditions directly (ps > 0.109). However, in the simulated action 
condition specifically, in order to determine whether personality traits were related to the physical power (force 
× speed) of utilitarian actions, we conducted bivariate correlations between traits and the power exerted when 
performing a utilitarian action (simulating a harmful act). Correlations revealed a significant positive correlation 
between power exerted and primary Psychopathy, (r(18) = 0.51, p = 0.022) and a significant negative correlation 
between power exerted and Honesty-Humility, (r(18) = −0.55, p = 0.013). In order to determine whether these 
traits predicted the power exerted by each participant, two univariate regressions were conducted. When the 
LSRP dimensions were entered as continuous predictors and proportion of force endorsed as the outcome varia-
ble, primary Psychopathy (LSRP dimension) was found to explain 26% of the variance in the model, (R2 = 0.260, 
F(1,18) = 6.33, p = 0.022) predicting the power exerted when simulating utilitarian actions using the vBOT sys-
tem (β = 0.04, p = 0.022) (see Fig. 3). Honesty-Humility, was a significant negative predictor of power exerted 
(β = −0.56, p = 0.013) when entered in an additional univariate regression with all HEXACO traits, explaining 
30% of the variance in the model, (R2 = 0.298, F(1,18) = 7.65, p = 0.013) (see Fig. 4).
Figure 2. Simulated Moral Action and Moral Judgment Responses. Responses (%) (utilitarian or non-
utilitarian) in the simulated action condition and judgment condition in response to personal force moral 
dilemmas. In the judgment condition, participants were asked both a morality question and behavioural 
question. A greater number of utilitarian endorsements were observed in the simulated action condition when 
the vBOT system was used to generate actions. Error bars represent +−1 SE.
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Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, whilst we included a haptic device (vBOT system) in order to allow simulations of moral 
actions, we are aware of the limitations of relying on text-based formulations of personal-force dilemmas. 
Previous research examining simulated murder has predominantly incorporated life-like stimuli such as PVC 
arms9, whereas Experiment 1 relied on text and the use of a more abstract response device (vBOT arm) which 
may “…lack salient properties reliably associated with victim distress”9. As such and in order to examine the com-
bined effects of visual immersion in state-of-the-art VR technologies and haptic feedback based on realistically 
simulated moral actions, Experiment 2 combined the visually immersive virtual version of the footbridge dilemma 
described in previous research4,18 and an interactive sculpture mechanism designed to generate haptic feedback 
and the sensation of pushing the person off the footbridge.
Methods
Participants. Twenty-five participants (13 females, 12 males, Mage = 33.80, SD = 13.51 years, age range: 19–64 
years) were recruited from the public in Plymouth and the surrounding area of Devon and took part on a vol-
untary basis during a public engagement event at Plymouth University. Data were collected in a separate room 
divided from the main foyer of the event, with the primary investigator and a research collaborator present. 
Figure 3. Primary Psychopathy Scores and Power. Primary psychopathy scores plotted against power exerted 
when simulating utilitarian (harmful) moral actions with the vBOT. The power exerted when simulating a 
utilitarian (harmful) action with the vBOT, was positively correlated with primary Psychopathy score. Note. The 
high reading at 3.25 power was investigated following visual inspection. Given that Spearman’s rho is robust 
to these univariate outliers30, correlational analyses were repeated using this procedure. Power continued to be 
positively associated with primary psychopathy, (rs(18) = 0.45, p = 0.045).
Figure 4. Honesty-Humility Scores and Power. Honesty-Humility scores plotted against power exerted when 
simulating utilitarian (harmful) moral actions with the vBOT. The power exerted when simulating a utilitarian 
(harmful) action with the vBOT, was negatively correlated with Honesty-Humility score. Note: The robustness 
of this relationship was examined in light of the high reading at 3.25 power. As such, correlational analyses 
were replicated using Spearman’s rho. Power continued to be negatively associated with Honesty-Humility, 
(rs(18) = −0.47, p = 0.039).
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This research received ethical approval from Plymouth University Ethics Committee and informed consent was 
obtained from all participants. All experiments were performed in accordance with the guidelines and regulations 
set out by the ethics committee.
Moral Action Measure. The virtual version of the footbridge dilemma18 is an audio-visual virtual scenario 
presented to participants via a head-mounted display. The footbridge dilemma as described in Foot3 plays out in 
real-time with the participant standing on a footbridge behind a large virtual human (see Fig. 5). Verbal instruc-
tions are played during the scenario describing the situation as it plays out, finishing with the statement (“If you’re 
going to push them, do it now, but it is your choice”). In the original experiment, as described in Francis, et al.18, 
participants were then given a maximum of ten seconds to respond in the dilemma by either pushing the person 
with a joystick device or by choosing to do nothing. In the present experiment, all elements of the virtual dilemma 
were kept the same including the audio descriptions and response time. However, the joystick device was replaced 
with an interactive sculpture mechanism. As part of a multidisciplinary project, the interactive sculpture was 
designed in the shape of a large person’s back (see Fig. 6). This response device had several key features designed 
to generate haptic feedback and create an immersive experience for participants:
 (i). The body of the sculpture itself was created using expandable foam and finished with platinum grade sili-
con. When fabric was placed over this textured surface, the feeling of the sculpture mirrored that of a real 
person. Heated wiring was also built in beneath the silicon coating to warm the sculpture, again generating 
a life-like touch (see Fig. 6).
 (ii). Sections of rubber were added to the front of the sculpture ensuring that enough resistance would be gen-
erated if someone attempted to push the sculpture forward. These rubber sections would hit the surround-
ing frame of the sculpture if it was only pushed tentatively. If pushed hard enough and with a more realistic 
force, the rubber sections would move past the frame, causing the sculpture to fall.
 (iii). Upon falling, the sculpture would trigger the joystick mechanism, resulting in the person in the virtual 
dilemma falling off the bridge. This established synchronisation between the physical sensation of pushing 
and seeing the person fall in VR.
Procedure
Participants were given the pre-questionnaire incorporated within Experiment 1 assessing previous gaming expe-
rience. Participants then entered a quiet room and were asked to place the Oculus Rift headset on and a pair of 
Sennheiser headphones. Subsequently, participants were guided forward into a separate room which held the 
interactive sculpture. This set-up was designed to ensure that participants did not see the sculpture in real-life, 
ensuring an immersive experience. Based on the participants’ height, they were placed at the correct distance 
from the sculpture in order to synchronise the sculpture location in real-life with the virtual person’s location in 
VR. Once the virtual dilemma had loaded, participants were verbally informed of the following; “You can interact 
with the person standing in front of you, by reaching out with your right arm”. Upon hearing this information, par-
ticipants would extend their right arm and make contact with the interactive sculpture familiarizing them with 
Figure 5. The Virtual Footbridge Dilemma. Stereoscopic image showing a scene from the footbridge virtual 
dilemma through Oculus Rift head-mounted display as seen in Francis et al.16. The image is taken from the 
viewpoint of the participant at the end of the scenario in which the trolley car is about to collide with the 
virtual avatars standing on the tracks ahead. Participants are able to rotate in the virtual environment and voice 
commands are included to ensure full understanding of the events playing out.
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its location. No further information was given following this and participants continued to listen to the audio 
descriptions as the scenario played out in VR as described in Francis, et al.18.
Comparative Conditions. We compared responses made using this setup (haptic-VR action condition) to 
responses collected in Experiment 2 of the original paper incorporating the virtual footbridge dilemma (VR action 
condition) and text-based footbridge dilemma (judgment condition)18. This population was deemed an adequate 
comparative sample having also been sampled from the public in Plymouth and the surrounding area, with sim-
ilar gender and age ratios18. In the VR action condition, participants completed the VR footbridge dilemma, as 
described above, but using a joystick device. A utilitarian endorsement was given by pushing the joystick forward 
and a non-utilitarian decision was given by choosing to do nothing. In the judgment condition, participants 
responded to the text-based footbridge dilemma and as in Experiment 1, responded to both a morality question 
(“Is it morally acceptable to [specific to the scenario]?”) followed by a behavioural question (“Would you do it?”). 
Responses were given by selecting “Yes” (Y-key) or “No” (N-key).
Results
Pre-questionnaire Responses. It was found that simulating a utilitarian action in the haptic-VR action 
condition using the interactive sculpture was not associated with previous gaming experience, as shown 
using bivariate Spearman correlations comparing utilitarian actions and hours per week of video game play, 
(rs(23) = 0.29, p = 0.163) and number of games played annually (rs(23) = 0.28, p = 0.177).
Moral Responses. We compared responses from the haptic-VR action condition (N = 25) from the present 
research to responses from the VR action condition (N = 30) and judgment condition (N = 30) from previous 
research18. In the judgment condition, when asked if the act was morally acceptable, 10% of participants endorsed 
a utilitarian response (i.e. judge that they regard pushing the person as morally acceptable). In the VR action 
condition, 63.3% of participants generated a simulated utilitarian response (i.e. pushed the person off the bridge 
using the joystick). In the haptic-VR action condition in the present experiment, 56% of participants generated a 
simulated utilitarian response (i.e. pushed the person off the bridge using the interactive sculpture). A chi-square 
analysis revealed a significant difference between these three conditions, (χ²(2) = 20.18, p < 0.001).
We used chi-square follow-up tests with Bonferroni corrections (p < 0.016) to determine which conditions 
were significantly different. As reported in Francis, et al.18, utilitarian endorsements were significantly higher in 
the VR action condition compared to the judgment condition, (χ²(1) = 18.37, p < 0.001). Utilitarian endorse-
ments were also significantly higher in the new haptic-VR action condition when compared to the judgment 
condition, (χ²(1) = 13.51, p < 0.001). The odds of participants producing a simulated utilitarian response were 
11.55 times higher in the VR-haptic condition than in the judgment condition. There was no significant difference 
Figure 6. The Interactive Sculpture Mechanism. (a) The diagram shows the side-view of the interactive 
sculpture. The participant would stand behind the back of the torso wearing the Oculus Rift. If they chose to 
endorse a utilitarian action, they would then apply pressure to the back of the torso with their own hand. Rubber 
sections on the outside of the sculpture would generate resistance when pushed and would spring forward to 
release the body of the sculpture if pushed hard enough. A wooden runner would then capture the weight of 
the body as it fell, pushing the joystick forward, subsequently triggering the virtual action of pushing in the VR 
headset. (b) Photograph displaying the silicon beneath the fabric covering the back of the torso. Heated wiring 
sits beneath this silicon layer generating a body-like temperature.
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between moral actions in the VR action condition from Francis, et al.18 and the moral actions in the new 
haptic-VR action condition (p > 0.580). When asked if they would perform the action (behavioural question) 
in the judgment condition, the same responses were observed with 10% of participants endorsing a utilitarian 
response in the text-based footbridge dilemma, compared to the 63.3% who endorsed the action in the VR action 
condition, (χ²(1) = 18.37, p < 0.001) and the 56% of participants who endorsed the action in the new haptic-VR 
action condition, (χ²(1) = 13.51, p < 0.001) (see Fig. 7).
General Discussion
In two studies, we observed greater utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas when they were presented as phys-
ically and visually salient simulations. In Experiment 1, individuals receiving haptic feedback by simulating 
actions using the vBOT system, demonstrated a higher endorsement of utilitarian action when compared to indi-
viduals who made moral judgments within the traditional paradigm. In Experiment 2, when visually immersive 
VR was combined with a life-like response device that felt like a human body, greater simulated utilitarian action 
was again observed in response to the moral dilemma. While the pattern of moral judgments collected in the 
present investigation supports existing models of moral judgment, demonstrating fewer utilitarian responses to 
personal moral dilemmas2,6, the pattern of simulated moral action appears to sit in contrast, with greater utilitar-
ian actions observed in personal dilemmas. In previous VR paradigms, this preference for generating simulated 
utilitarian action in VR has been linked to contextual saliency; the physical features of VR allow agents to “see” 
victims and this alters the way in which actions and outcomes are evaluated in moral dilemmas10,18. Greater 
negative emphasis may be placed on witnessing victims die rather than on producing simulated harmful actions, 
subsequently resulting in greater utilitarian responses8,10,18. Whilst this theory may explain the findings from 
Experiment 2, it fails to fully explain the results of Experiment 1 when visual components of VR were absent. 
When utilising the vBOT system, participants were not able to “see” victims, yet greater preference for making a 
simulated utilitarian action remained. As such, an additional explanation of the present findings is required. One 
possible explanation for this could rest in frame of reference accounts of judgment versus actions17. According 
to these accounts, action choices are driven by egocentric perspectives and unlike judgments, may overlap with 
self-interested motivations as individuals consider the self-relevant consequences of their actions17,19. Judging, on 
the other hand, relies on allocentric considerations influenced by cultural norms17. As such, the present research 
suggests that the judgment-action discrepancy observed here, appears to result from a combination of contextual 
salience10,18 and frame of reference accounts17.
While previous research has found a relationship between anti-social and pro-social personality traits and simulated 
moral action10, in Experiment 1, psychopathy was found to predict the power exerted when simulating a harmful action 
rather than the harmful actions themselves. Honesty-Humility, a pro-social trait negatively associated with the Dark 
Triad (a set of traits associated with malevolent qualities)26, negatively predicted this power. Research has increasingly 
pointed to the ambiguity of the motives underlying the responses given in trolley-type dilemmas; given that they may 
not derive from a moral concern but may stem from a lack of aversion to harm in certain individuals27,28. Perhaps, the 
power with which a moral action is simulated may provide a sensitive measure of the non-moral motivations that drive 
so-called “moral” actions in these virtual frameworks, beyond that of behavioural moral responses. However, these 
Figure 7. Moral Action and Moral Judgment Responses. Responses (%) in the haptic-VR action condition 
from Experiment 2 and VR action and judgment responses as reported in Francis, et al.14. In the judgment 
condition, participants were asked whether the action was morally acceptable and whether they would do it. 
In the VR action condition, participants completed the VR footbridge dilemma and responded using a joystick. 
In the Haptic-VR action condition, participants responded to the VR footbridge dilemma using the interactive 
sculpture mechanism. A greater number of utilitarian actions were observed in both the haptic-VR action and 
VR action conditions. Error bars represent +−1 SEp.
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conclusions are given tentatively and future research should consider adopting approaches from differential psychology 
in order to explore the role of pro- and anti-social traits further with larger sample sizes.
Given the combination of the methodological approaches introduced here, we also explore additional inter-
pretations of the present findings that need addressing. Firstly, the suggestion that the prevalence of simulated 
utilitarian actions observed may derive from gaming-related behaviours is not supported in the current research. 
Simulated moral actions were not predicted by self-assessments of game-related experiences (hours per week of 
video game play and number of games played annually) in either Experiment 1 or 2 suggesting that the responses 
simulated with the vBOT and interactive sculpture were not akin to desensitized actions often found in gam-
ing contexts18. Additionally, previous research assessing gaming affordance effects found that the incorporation 
of joystick devices did not influence simulated moral actions18 and therefore it is unlikely that the vBOT arm 
itself in Experiment 1 or the interactive and life-like sculpture in Experiment 2, influenced subsequent simulated 
moral actions. Secondly, it is also important to note that differences existed between the judgment and simulated 
action conditions in Experiment 1, in terms of the framing of the judgment-based or action-based instructions. 
Specifically, in the simulated action condition, when responding to dilemmas using the vBOT system, partici-
pants were presented with the phrase “Are you going to [specific to scenario]?” prior to responding whereas partici-
pants in the judgment condition were presented with a morality and behavioural question. However, results from 
a follow-up experiment (Supplementary Material: Appendix C online) failed to support the presence of potential 
framing effects. Therefore, it is unlikely that the prevalence of utilitarian actions simulated with the vBOT system 
were generated by coercive framing effects. Further, in Experiment 2 we demonstrate that preference for utili-
tarian actions remains when any possible text-based framing effects are removed altogether and replaced with 
visually immersive VR. Finally, it is also important to consider whether individuals are just more likely to act in 
immersive or haptic VR than in a text-based or theoretical situation. However, this explanation is not likely, given 
recent evidence that people are more likely to risk their own lives to save someone else in text-based vignettes, 
than in a VR counterpart condition29. If individuals were simply more likely to act in VR, then we would expect 
to see the opposite pattern, with more people acting altruistically in VR29.
It terms of addressing limitations, it is important to note that in Experiment 1, Honesty-Humility scores were 
higher in the judgment condition, than in the simulated action condition and that arguably, this could be respon-
sible for the differences in moral judgments and simulated moral actions. However, we would argue that these 
group differences in trait score were not likely responsible for the judgment-action discrepancy observed here, 
based on similar findings from previous virtual research also supporting this judgment-action discrepancy10,14,18. 
Further, reaction times were not compared across simulated action and judgment conditions as a result of differ-
ences in recording sensitivities. Given that reaction times can shed light on the mechanisms motivating conver-
gent moral responses2, future research investigating judgment-action discrepancy should compare reaction times 
for judgment versus simulated action paradigms as an additional measurement of interest.
In Experiment 2, it is important to raise concerns regarding the sense of presence generated by the combination 
of the interactive sculpture and the immersive virtual environment. In the present paradigm, no form of body track-
ing was included to ensure that the sculpture was precisely aligned with the virtual avatar in the scenario (alignment 
was completed manually based on each participant’s height and position). Furthermore, in the virtual environment, 
participants could not see their own body in virtual form. These limitations may have compromised the level of 
immersion that could be generated in the experiment and as such, future research should incorporate accurate 
tracking between real objects and their virtual counterparts to control for this potential confound. In addition, given 
that moral actions simulated using the interactive sculpture and VR paradigm in Experiment 2 were collected during 
a public engagement event, we were unable to assess personality traits. As such, future research could investigate 
simulated moral actions using these multidisciplinary approaches in lab-based settings in which personality traits 
can also be assessed. In terms of sampling, whilst we acknowledge the limitation of comparing data collected at a 
public engagement event to data collected in the lab at a different time, this was not likely a confound; sample char-
acteristics were similar having been collected from the public in Plymouth and the surrounding area.
Despite these shortcomings, the approaches to the investigation of simulated moral actions presented in this 
research, could offer insights into the embodied nature of morally-relevant actions beyond that of traditional 
moral judgment paradigms. It is important to note that in the present investigations, we did not aim to pre-
dict real-life behaviours from these experiments but rather to investigate the disparity between simulated moral 
action and moral judgment in controlled investigations of morality of harm. As such, we recommend that future 
research consider how these implicit measures of simulated moral action might predict real-world moral behav-
iours, expanding this research beyond hypothetical instances of simulated moral action. Although previously 
alien to the field of moral cognition and at the outset, these simulated moral action frameworks have allowed us 
to investigate the embodied nature of personal force and physical contact with greater significance than previ-
ously possible. Importantly, additional measures such as physical power, have offered us sensitive insights into 
high emotionally arousing moral scenarios, beyond those obtained in judgment-based paradigms. For example, 
researchers can now begin to investigate not only whether a simulated moral action was endorsed but how hard 
that action was simulated and what this might reflect about a person’s personality profile.
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